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ABSTRACT 
Transparency of information are the main requirement of market discipline mechanism which is 
described by an adequate disclosure. Through the quantitative approach, the customer will attract an 
investment funds (giro, savings, deposits) if the bank takes a high risk action based on information that 
disclosed on financial statements. In a theoretical view, Islamic banks with the principle of profit-loss 
sharing (PLS) have a higher risk than conventional banks with a fixed rate of interest, so that customers of 
Islamic banks should have a higher sensitivity than conventional bank customers. The next question, 
whether the customers of Islamic banks would react to the disclosure of financial statements through 
changes in the number of funds invested? 
This research aimed to examine the effect of the level of disclosure of financial statements to 
changes in the number of third party funds in Indonesia Islamic Banking on the period 2011-2014. Data 
were analyzed using a regression model. The study states that the level of disclosure of financial 
statements significant positive effect on changes in the number of third-party funds were indicates that 
there is a mechanism of market discipline on Islamic Banks in Indonesia. However, this result must to be 
strengthened by data of risk disclosure and ability to absorb information from customers, analysis of 
determinants were affecting customers behavior, then as well as the comparison test with conventional 
commercial banks. 
Keywords: Market Discipline, The Level of Disclosure, Third Party Funds, Islamic Bank 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Research Background  
Good description of the growth and development of Islamic banking (iB) in Indonesia (Bank 
Indonesia, 2014) have to be accompanied by the implementation of Good Corporate Governance for 
Islamic banking which transparency is the main pillar (Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 11/33 / PBI / 
2009). Another words, transparency is an absolute necessity in the world of banking in particular and 
general economic. But the reality today illustrates the opposite, which is visible from some of large 
accounting scandals in the world, such as Enron (in 2001), WorldCom (in 2002), and recently Lehman 
Brothers (in 2008) then have contribution to subprime mortgage USA 2008 may causes by a lack of 
disclosure or over-understatement information by the company (Shehata, 2014). 
Simillar to the situation in the world, transparency in Indonesia also remained at a low level. In 
auditing and reporting area, Indonesia has 74th out of 148 countries (The Global Competitiveness Report 
2013-2014). The results of Pricewaterhouse and Coopers survey of investors in Asia also shows that 
Indonesia has a low rank in transparency, disclosure standards and practices and the application of 
auditing, compared to other Asian countries and Australia (FCGI 2004 in Nuryaman, 2008). Those facts 
force Indonesia to increase transparency (disclosure level) of financial statements as well as the 
implementation of auditing standards and effective reporting. 
In Islamic banking, the issue of transparency is also a major concern of customers and other 
interested parties (Nurhayati and Wasilah, 2013). Lahrech et.al (2014) explains that transparency in 
Islamic banks with the terms of profit sharing distribution and placement of funds in customer deposits 
(investment account-holders) are not sufficient. Arifin et.al (2005) describes a perceptional by empirical 
research on issues of transparency and market discipline in Islamic banks from 14 countries showed that 
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transparency and disclosure of risks are unoptimal. Some of these phenomena, raises critical questions 
about the transparency (disclosure level) as well as the role of accounting which produce high quality of 
financial information on Islamic banks. 
Transparency in this study specifically refers to the level of disclosure in the financial statements. 
Hidayat and Abdulrahman (2014) examined the level of disclosure of the annual report on the fifth 
Islamic bank in Bahrain period in 2010 shows that that the Islamic bank has a high level of compliance to 
the AAOIFI standards. Al-Sawalqa (2014) also did research on the level of compliance with corporate 
governance mechanism in the aspects of transparency and disclosure as well as comprehensive voluntary 
disclosure on 13 banks in Jordan listed in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in 2012, the results showed 
that mandatory disclosure of Islamic banks is very high, but it is not accompanied with the same level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Several studies in middle eastern countries are taking the level of compliance of banks as the object 
of study, but the standards used such as AAOIFI standards and corporate governance mechanis just 
referring to generally sector. While in this study, has been using special accounting standards for financial 
statement disclosure of Islamic banking. In addition, high levels of Islamic bank disclosure of research 
results from  Abdulrahman Hidayat (2014) and Al-Sawalqa (2014) has not specially explain on bank risk 
aspect, thus contradict research from Lahrech et.al (2014) and Arifin et.al (2005 ). 
Recently, research on the level of disclosure of financial statements in Indonesia both mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure (Gray, et.al, 1995) have not been focused on the banking sector but in other 
sectors, namely: financing about to 79.56% (Oktaviani and Martani, 2006), manufacturing 64.75% 
(Primastuti and Achmad, 2012), property and real estate about to 57.24% - 77.45% (Agustina, 2012; 
Permata, 2013), about to 30.85% of government - 37.92% (Subkhan and Luthfiyati 2011; Suhardjanto 
and Yulianingtyas, 2011), and other sectors ranged from 34.32% to 58.87% (Nuryaman 2008; 
Hardiningsih 2008; Hapsoro, 2009; Wardani, 2012; Baskaraningrum and Merkusiwati, 2013). 
An adequate disclosure of financial statements make customers get information about the 
performance and risks of banks (Hosono, 2005; Stephanou, 2010; Febrian and Herwany, 2011). 
Customers will respond by withdraw deposits (quantitative approach) or set a high interest (price 
approach) in a bank that has a high risk, it is referred to as market discipline mechanism (Levi-Yeyati 
et.al, 2004; Hosono, 2005; Febrian and Herwany, 2011). Islamic banks with the principle of sharing will 
give the consequences of risk acceptable result customers are higher than conventional banks (Hasan, 
2013), so it indicate that customers sensitivity on Islamic banks is higher than conventional bank 
customers (Hasan and Tandelilin, 2012). However, whether customers of Islamic banks with no fixed 
acceptance will react to the information were disclosed in the financial statements by attracting deposits? 
Based on those explanation, in market discipline mechanism frame with a quantitative approach, this 
study tries to formulate a relationship between the level of disclosure of financial statements with changes 
in the number of third-party funds (giro, saving, deposits) in Islamic banks.  
1.2 Research Problem 
 The research problem is whether customers of Islamic banks with no fixed acceptance will react to 
the information were disclosed in the financial statements by attracting deposits? 
1.3 Research Purpose 
 This research aims to know and examines customers of Islamic banks with no fixed acceptance will 
react to the information were disclosed in the financial statements by attracting deposits. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
2.1.1 Sharia Enterprise Theory 
Theory of sharia within the scope of corporate accounting will initially be directed to the concept of 
vertical accountability and continuing through the implementation of the concept of horizontal 
accountability (Triyuwono, 2006: 340-341). The concept of vertical accountability explains that God as 
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the Ultimate Principal assigns human (agents) to spread the grace and welfare (in the form of economic, 
social, spiritual, political and so on) to another human being (stakeholders) and nature (natural 
environment) (Triyuwono and Roekhudin, 2000: 157-164 in Triyuwono, 2006: 340). Furthermore, the 
human task must be applied in life so the agent (management) should be responsible to society 
(stakeholders) and nature (universe), is called horizontal accountability (Triyuwono and Roekhudin, 
2000: 157-164 in Triyuwono, 2006: 341 ). Company has an obligation as a responsible agent vertically to 
God and horizontally to stakeholders and nature through the disclosure and presentation of corporate 
information in a fair, transparent, full disclosure, and not favoring one particular group. In other words, all 
parties get access to information about the company's decision-making. 
2.1.2 Stakeholders Theory 
Stakeholder theory described that group of people or individuals can influence the company's 
activities or may be affected by the activities of the company, either directly affect the company (primary 
stakeholders) such as the owner-shareholder-investors, managers and employees, customers or clients, 
local communities and other business partners, and indirectly affect the company (secondary 
stakeholders) such as government, civil organizations, social groups, media and academia, as well as 
business competitors (Freeman, 1984). These linkages will lead to consequences that companies need to 
implement responsibilities to stakeholders and to implement good corporate governance (GCG), which is 
expected to meet the interest of stakeholders (Deegan, 2000). Transparency as a major pillar of good 
corporate governance can be realized by relevant and adequate disclosure for stakeholders (Arifin et.al, 
2005; Hosono, 2005; Stephanou, 2010; Febrian and Herwany, 2011). Disclosure is a form of corporate 
responsibility to the stakeholder to reduce asymmetry information between the two sides (Deegan, 2004: 
267), so it can be support the process of rational economic decision. With the disclosure of stakeholders 
can minimize losses due to errors in economic decisions. 
2.1.3 Market Discipline Theory 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) determined the three pillars of efforts to improve 
health and safety (safety and soundness) of banks in the financial system, namely; 1) market discipline, 2) 
minimum capital standards, 3) regulatory process for the regulator. Market discipline is one of the pillars 
of the three elements that complement each other in order to realize the banking world a healthy and safe. 
Stephanou (2010) defines market discipline as a mechanism which market participants can monitor 
and discipline the behavior of excessive risk-taking by banks. This is in line with the arguments put 
forward by Levi-Yeyati et.al (2004), Hosono (2005), as well as Febrian and Herwany (2011). 
Disclosure of information (transparency) is the first aspect in the framework of market discipline 
(Stephanou, 2010; Hasan, 2013). By the disclosure, market participants can process the information, and 
oversight of the bank so that there will be market discipline mechanism. Halamainen et.al (2003, 2005) 
and Hasan (2013) also added that transparency should be present in effective market discipline. 
The principle of revenue sharing on Islamic banks that do not give fixed revenue will give impact in 
the risk acceptance for customers is higher than conventional bank (Hasan, 2013). The results of 
empirical research by Hasan and Tandelilin (2012) uses the data of annual financial reports from 120 
conventional and Islamic banks 2005-2009 were indicate that market discipline by depositors of Islamic 
banks is more powerful than depositors of conventional banks. Reaction depositors in Islamic banks are 
stronger because they are facet to the higher risk acceptance as a consequence of the principle of profit 
and loss sharing (Hasan and Tandelilin, 2012; Hasan, 2013). 
Levi-Yeyati et.al (2004) states that the reaction of depositors on the bank's risk can be seen through 
two types of approach; 1) a quantitative approach (withdraw deposits), and 2) price approach (set interest 
rates or for a high yield). Especially for this study is more relevant to look at the reaction of the market 
(market power) using a quantitative approach that can be observed on the fluctuations of changes in the 
number of third party funds in period of research. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Research Design 
Descriptive research is used to analyze and present data that is quantitative research. Levels of disclosure 
(Y) as the independent variable is measured by an index referred to the disclosure from Wallace, et.al 
(1994) as well as a combination mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Item of mandatory 
disclosure made by PAPSI 2003 (Attachment 1), while the voluntary items (Attachment 2) refers to the 
instruments developed by Al-Baluchi (2006) which was adapted the items already included in PAPSI 
2003 was not put back in the item voluntary disclosure. Changes in the number of third party funds (Z) as 
the dependent variable is measured by the difference between third party fund current period (t) with third 
party funds the previous period (t-1) in the form of the natural logarithm (Levy-Yeyati, 2004; Hasan and 
Tandelilin 2012 ) . The third party funds of islamic banks in this study refers to the DSN MUI fatwa no. 
1-3 Th 2000 which consist of giro, savings, deposits of mudharabah. 
Table 1 Research Variables and Indicator 
Variable Variable Indicator Scale 
Level of 
Disclosure 
(Y) 
Disclosure Index (DI) 
The number of disclosure items 
disclosed by the company 
(mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure) in the financial 
statements. (Wallace, et.al, 1994) 
 
 
 
       
  
n : the number of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure items 
disclosed 
k : the number of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure items 
are set to be revealed 
 
 
 
 
Ratios 
 
Changes of Third 
Party Funds 
(Z) 
∆ Third Party Funds (ΔDPK) 
Changes (increase or decrease) 
the number of public deposits in 
the form of giro, savings and 
deposits mudharabah from 
current period against the 
previous period.  
(Levy-Yeyati, 2004; Hasan and 
Tandelilin, 2012)  
 
 
Ln Δ Third-party Funds (DPK) 
= Ln (DPK(t) - DPK (t-1)) 
 
 
 
Ratios 
 
3.2 Population and Sample 
 Unit of analysis are Islamic Banks (BUS) in Indonesia (Attachment 3). Population (Sekaran, 2003: 
59) in this study was the annual financial statements of BUS in Indonesia with the consistency of data 
acquisition during the study period of 2011-2014 then obtain 11 BUS. The sampling technique used is 
saturated sampling that all members of the population were used as a sample of 44 annual financial 
statements (Sugiyono, 2011: 68), so the data is combination of cross-sectional data and time-series data. 
This type of data is secondary data obtained from official official website BUS in Indonesia by means of 
documentation and then analyzed one by one in order to obtain the relevant data. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 Data analysis method used was simple linear regression model (simple regression) Testing of 
hypothesis on the causal model or Ordinary Least Square (OLS) can be applied to the analysis of the 
model separately, the variable Y affects Z, but Z does not affect Y thus showing unilateral causal 
dependence. Previous first tested the normality and classical assumption (heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation). The research model as follows: 
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Where: 
Z = Change of Third Party Funds 
β0 = constant (intercept) 
β = coefficient of regression 
Y = Level of Financial Statements 
e = error 
 
The hypothesis is: 
H0: β ≤ 0, meaning that the level of disclosure of financial statements no significant positive effect on 
Δ third party funds. 
Ha: β> 0, meaning that the level of disclosure of financial statements Δ significant positive effect on 
third-party funds. 
Testing of hypothesis partially (t test) test using the right side, with the following criteria: 
Ho can not be rejected if t ≤ t table or sig> 0.05, Ho can be rejected if t> t table or sig <0.05 
4. RESEARCH RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
4.1. Descriptive 
 The general picture that are in the highest level of disclosure of Bank Syariah Mandiri and Bank 
Indonesia Muammalat by 71%, while Maybank Syariah was lower by 56% (Appendix 4). The average 
index of mandatory disclosure of bank Muammalat highest in 71%, while Bank Mega Syariah recorded 
the lowest value of 46% (Appendix 5). Bank Syariah Mandiri has the highest level of voluntary disclosure 
of which is equal to 80%, while Maybank Syariah re-recorded with the lowest value of 63% (Appendix 
6). Changes in the number of third party funds (DPK) is the highest in the Bank Syariah Mandiri with an 
average ΔDPK amounted to 9.15 trillion rupiah, while the lowest was Maybank Syariah ΔDPK with an 
average of 0.21 trillion rupiah (Appendix 7). Results Descriptive statistics of the variables are as follows: 
Table 2 Results of Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Y (DI) 44 54,13 72,39 62,4490 4,62644 
Z (LnDPK) 44 22,33 30,24 27,5588 1,59568 
Valid N (listwise) 44     
Source: data were processed using SPSS ver 20 
Variable rate of disclosure or disclosure index (Y) shows that the lowest value is 54,13, namely Maybank 
Syariah in 2011, while the highest value is 72.39, Bank Muamalat Indonesia in 2013, and the average 
value is 62.4490. Standard deviation of 4.62644 so if it happens deviation is no more than 4.62644 or -
4.62644. Variable Ln DPK (Z) shows that the lowest value is 22.33 which is Maybank Syariah in 2011, 
while the highest value is 30.24, Bank Syariah Mandiri in 2011 and the average value is 27.5588. 
Standard deviation of 1.59568, which means if there is deviation is the average then no more than 
1.59568 or -1.59568. 
 Normality of the data was tested with Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed the results of the p-value 
(sig) = 0.911 greater than 0.05, which means that the distribution of the data has to meet the assumptions 
of normality (Attachment 8). While the residual value of the estimated regression results also have to 
meet the assumption of normal distribution as indicated by the spread of data around a diagonal line on 
the graph-Normal Probability Plots (Appendix 9). The pattern of the spread of residual regression 
equations on a graph Scetter plot shows that the points do not form a particular pattern and dots spread 
Z = β0 + βY + e 
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above and below the number 0 (zero) on the Y axis, the model is homoskedastik or not there is a problem 
of heteroscedasticity (Appendix 10). Autocorrelation test is indicated by the value of Durbin Watson of 
DW = 1.691 (Appendix 11) which is in the area hesitation (Appendix 12), so it is necessary to continue 
with the test Run test to determine the randomness of the error value regression model and obtained sig 
Run test 0.996> 0 , 05 which means that the value of residual random or it can be concluded there is no 
autocorrelation problem for the regression model used (Appendix 13). 
4.2. Research Discussion 
Table 3 Coefficient Y to Z 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 4,683 1,796  2,607 ,014 
Y_hat(Unstandardized 
Predicted Value) 
,366 ,029 ,917 12,761 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Z (LnDPK) 
Source: data were processed using SPSS ver 20 
From the table above can be the result of a simple linear regression equation for the effect of the level of 
disclosure to ΔDPK is Y = 4.683 + 0.366 constants obtained from the equation (intercept) of 4.683 which 
means ΔDPK without the influence of any factor is equal to 4.683. The regression coefficient disclosure 
level (Y) is positive, amounting to 0.366, which means if the disclosure level of 1%, then ΔDPK will 
increased by 0.366%. So the higher the level of disclosure will be followed by a rise of ΔDPK. To 
determine whether there is a direct influence on the level of disclosure ΔDPK, t test analysis carried out 
by setting a confidence interval of 95% or α = 5%. 
Table 4 Tabel Coefficient (t test) 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T S
Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 
,
,683 
1,796 
 2
,607 
,
014 
Y_hat(Unstandardized Predicted Value) 
,
366 
,029 ,917 
1
2,761 
,
000 
a. Dependent Variable: Z (LnDPK) 
Source: data were processed using SPSS ver 20 
This study examined the correctness of the return market discipline described by Stephanou (2010) 
related customer response (ΔDPK) on the level of disclosure. According to Stephanou (2010) 
transparency of company information which is indicated by the level of disclosure is the main condition 
the market discipline mechanism, it is in line with that expressed by Arifin et.al (2005), Hosono (2005), 
Febrian and Herwany (2011), as well as strengthened with the opinion of Halamainen et.al (2003, 2005) 
and Hasan (2013) which mentions transparency as a condition of effective market discipline mechanism. 
Lachrech et.al (2014) adds that the increase in transparency will lead to improved governance of 
investment fund clients by Islamic banks and avoid the practice of allocation of benefits that are not in 
favor of the customer. 
 Market participants will absorb the information that disclosed from bank primarily related to 
performance and risk, and will give the same response using quantitative approach to attract deposits if 
high risk or otherwise low performance (Levy-Yeyati et.al, 2004) are illustrated through. Respon changes 
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has been describe by increase or decrease the number of third-party funds (ΔDPK). A quantitative 
approach is more often used in research because it can be directly observed by fluctuations of DPK and 
demonstrate the market power of customers. 
 Hasan and Tandelilin (2012) using the change in the number of deposits (the dependent variable) as 
a proxy for market discipline in t period  to the financial risks of banks as a variable independent in t-1 
period to detect market discipline Islamic banks and conventional banks in Indonesia before and after the 
global crisis. The results showed a stronger market discipline in the past before the crisis (2005-2007) 
than during the crisis and its aftermath (2008-2009). Similar disclosed by Taswan (2011), which 
examines market discipline as a control banking risks found that there is a mechanism of market 
discipline in Indonesia either when deposit guarantee implicit or explicit, so that it can be concluded that 
the decision of depositors purely influenced because of the bank's risk is high and not due to the guarantee 
scheme.  
 In the context of empirical studies of Islamic banking, this research also supported by Hasan and 
Tandelilin (2012) which states that the practice of market discipline in Islamic banks are stronger than 
conventional banks. This is in line with empirical research perceptional Arifin et.al (2005), which outlines 
the level of risk disclosure Islamic banks should be higher than conventional banks, as well as reinforced 
with theoretical arguments of Hasan (2013) which explains that risk acceptable result is greater islamic 
bank customers rather than risk an acceptable result of conventional bank customers related to the concept 
of profit sharing (profit loss sharing) as the main principles of sharia bank operations with the 
consequences of not fixed receiving income. This study therefore indicates the market discipline 
mechanism occurs in the BUS in Indonesia during 2011-2014. The mechanism shown through significant 
positive effect on the level of disclosure to the market response in the form of ΔDPK which means that 
the higher the level of disclosure of the higher ΔDPK. 
 Other studies on market discipline is also done by Jatna (2007) and Valensi (2005) however showed 
different results. Research carried out in some groups of conventional commercial bank in Indonesia, 
Jatna (2007) concluded that there has been no effectiveness in market discipline. This is due to the low 
understanding of the financial statements of banks and limited access to information  about performance 
of individual banks. 
 Valensi (2005) test for the presence of market discipline by depositors and fellow bank (peer-banks) 
in Indonesia with a bank classifies on the basis of ownership relationship with Power Center Commercial 
(Commercial Power Centres - CPC). The results showed that the discipline of the market in Indonesia is 
still weak because it tends to occur only on the banks of non-CPC. This study concluded that the 
mechanism of market discipline less effective for developing countries. Differences in the results of this 
study with Jatna (2007) and Valensi (2005) may be due to differences in the study period, the research 
object in the form of Islamic banks as well as the different guarantee schemes. 
Table 5 Model Summary 
Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
,840 ,835 ,64831 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Y_hat(Unstandardized Predicted Value) 
b. Dependent Variable: Z (LnDPK) 
Source: data were processed using SPSS ver 20 
Coefficient of determination can be seen in the value of Adjusted R Square (R2) of 0.835 means ΔDPK 
(Z) can be explained by the independent variable level of disclosure (Y) amounted to 83.5%. The 
remaining 16.5% (100% - 83.5%) is explained by other causes beyond the model. The level of disclosure 
could reasonably explain ΔDPK but there are other factors that affect ΔDPK. 
 There are several other factors that can influence the pattern of market discipline in this case ΔDPK, 
one of which is data regarding disclosure of bank risk to the public. Arifin et.al (2005) in his study 
mentioned that the level of risk disclosure Islamic banks is still low and does not depict the actual bank 
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risks. Lachrech et.al (2014) describes the importance of Islamic banking standards enforcement 
transparency. In this case the role of Islamic banking regulatory standards that PAPSI need more 
emphasis on the disclosure of risks. So that the material can be further study, whether the standard of 
disclosure contained in PAPSI 2003 also recently PAPSI 2013 has been described the condition of the 
real risk of Islamic banks? 
 Basic information is also a determining factor of market discipline, in this view the client's ability to 
absorb and analyze information that is then used as the basis for decision making. Hasan, et.al (2012) 
discovered the phenomenon that the actions of depositors is more influenced rumors and Central Bank 
support directly interpreted as an indication of financial difficulties at the bank. Errors in receipt of this 
information can lead to errors in decision making. Therefore, absorption and analytical power of customer 
information needs to be observed further. The critical question that will appear, if the customer can 
actually take advantage of the performance and risk information has been disclosed by the bank? Or 
whether the customer actually has to read financial statements of banks and fundamental analysis as a 
basis for decision making? 
 Analysis of factors that affect the sensitivity of the customers also need to be an object in next 
research. Some studies say that deposit insurance can affect the sensitivity of the customer as well as the 
impact on the market the disciplinary mechanism paper mentioned that besides recommending sufficient 
level of disclosure, Hosono (2005) sees need a limitation of deposit protection to increase market 
discipline. Febrian and Herwany (2011) also questioned the sensitivity depositors against bank risk in 
emerging countries to which it deposits insured by the government or other agency concerned. Just 
feeling safe, depositors in Indonesia tendency to be indifferent to the risks of Islamic banks and 
conventional banks for deposits are insured or guaranteed (Febrian and Herwany, 2011). 
 In other words, deposit insurance can affect the sensitivity of deposan. Although in the context of 
Islamic banks no fixed return or high risk -yield, the depositors sensitivity will be less if there is a high 
level of guarantee deposits. This is in line with the opinion of Levy-Yeyati et.al (2004) that the notion of 
market discipline in developing economies need to take into account the systemic risk that linearly with 
the level of the deposit guarantee. In Turkey, the revision insurance policy to which it all banks are under 
the same deposit insurance company, so there is no double element in the guarantee system (Aysan, et.al, 
2015). 
 Other factors such as the level of stability Islamic banks also affect the behavior of customers and 
market discipline scheme (Gamaginta and Rokhim, 2010). Exploratory factor analysis is performed by 
Abduh (2011) in detecting the risk of withdrawal of deposits by customers using the approach to quality 
Islamic banking services with five dimensi. Test of comparison market discipline mechanisms between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks also need to be studied further, to see the consistency of the results 
Hasan and Tandelilin (2012) regarding the scheme stronger market discipline on islamic banking. 
5. RESEARCH CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1. Conclusion 
 The level of disclosure (mandatory and voluntary disclosure) were highest at Bank Syariah Mandiri 
and Bank Indonesia Muammalat by 71%, while Maybank Syariah is the lowest at 56%. Changes in the 
number of Third Party Funds (ΔDPK) were highest at Bank Syariah Mandiri with an average ΔDPK 
amounted to 9.15 trillion rupiah, while the lowest was Maybank Syariah ΔDPK with an average of 0.21 
trillion rupiah. Then from the regression analysis results disclosure level significant positive effect on 
ΔDPK, this suggests that the market (customers) to respond the information on the performance and risks 
of the company through changes in total deposits. In other words happen mechanism of market discipline 
on Islamic banking in Indonesia in 2011-2014. Contribution of this study is to show the overview of level 
of disclosure sharia banking in Indonesia which has not been done by previous research. The results of 
this study could be a matter of evaluation for Islamic banking in order to improve transparency which is 
provide relevant information to stakeholders for decision making. For the regulator can be input in the 
formulation of standards (PAPSI) related to the relevance of disclosure risk. 
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5.2. Limitation 
Limitations of this study is data sharia banking in Indonesia is still limited to 11 banks, and this 
research has not touched the other factors that affect both the market discipline mechanism potentially as 
control variables, intervening and moderating.  
5.3. Recommendation 
 This study still needs to be strengthened by the data disclosure risks and absorption of customer 
information, analysis of factors that affect the sensitivity of customers, among others; deposit insurance, 
systemic risk, quality of service Islamic bank, and so on. This research is also necessary to test a 
comparison with a conventional bank. The importance of these factors can be material for future research 
related to market discipline. 
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I. Appendix 
Appendix 1 Items of Mandatory Disclosure  
No.  Items of Informations ∑  
1. Chapter II – Financial Statement of Islamic Bank  34 
2. Chapter III – Assets 127 
3. Chapter IV – Liability 39 
4. Chapter V – Investment 6 
5. Chapter VI – Equity 14 
6. Chapter VII – Income Statements 8 
7. Chapter VIII – Cash Flows 14 
8. Chapter IX – Changes of Equity Statements 1 
9. Chapter X – Changes of Restricted Fund Statements 
(Mudharabah Muqayyadah)  
7 
10. Chapter XI – Source and Use of ZIS Funds Statement 
(Zakat, Infaq, Shadaqah) 
6 
11. Chapter XII – Source and Use of Qardh Funds 
(Qardhul Hasan)  
3 
12. Bagian XIII – Notes to Financial Statements 110 
Amount Items of Mandatory Disclosure 369 
Source: PAPSI 2003 
Appendix 2  Items of Voluntary Dsiclosure 
No.  Items of Information Jumlah Item  
1. General Information of Company 15 
2. Reporting 4 
3. Information of Financial Statements 17 
4. Information of Notes to Financial Statements 35 
Amount Items of Voluntary Disclosure 71 
Source: Al-Baluchi (2006) 
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Appendix 3 Unit of Analysis of Islamic Banks in Indonesia 
No.  Name of Islamic Banks  
1 Bank Syariah Mandiri 
2 Bank Mega Syariah 
3 Bank BNI Syariah 
4 Bank BRI Syariah 
5 Bank Muamalat Indonesia 
6 Bank BJB Syariah 
7 Bank Panin Syariah 
8 Bank Bukopin Syariah 
9 Bank Victoria Syariah 
10 Bank BCA Syariah 
11 Bank Maybank Syariah 
12 Bank BTPN Syariah 
Source: Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (2015)  
Appendix 4 Graph of Islamic Banks Disclosure Index 2011-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data is processed from Islamic Banks Annual Report 
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Appendix 5 Graph of Islamic Banks Mandatory Disclosure Index 2011-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data is processed from Islamic Banks Annual Report 
Appendix 6 Graph of Islamic Banks Voluntary Disclosure Index 2011-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data is processed from Islamic Banks Annual Report 
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Appendix 7 Graph of Changes in The Number of Third Party Funds 2011-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data is processed from Islamic Banks Annual Report 
 
Appendix 8 Normality Test Results 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 Unstandardized 
Residual 
N 33 
Normal Parameters
a,b
 
Mean 0E-7 
Std. 
Deviation 
2,33737320 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute ,098 
Positive ,082 
Negative -,098 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z ,562 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,911 
a. Test distribution is Normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
 
Criteria: 
Sig. > α → data is normally distributed 
Sig. < α → data is abnormally distributed 
 
Source: Data processed using SPSS ver 20 
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Appendix 9  Normality Test Chart - Normal P Plot 
 
Source: Data processed using SPSS ver 20 
 
Appendix 10 Graph of Heteroscedasticity Results 
 
Source: Data processed using SPSS ver 20 
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Appendix 11  Autocorrelation Results – Durbin Watson 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics Durbin
-
Watso
n 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F 
Chan
ge 
1 
,863
a
 
,745 ,708 2,49876 ,745 20,424 4 28 ,000 1,691 
a. Predictors: (Constant), X4 (FDR), X1 (Ln aset), X2 (DER), X3 (ROA) 
b. Dependent Variable: Y (DI) 
 
Source: Data processed using SPSS ver 20 
 
Appendix 12  Results of Autocorrelation Decission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
H0 diterima 
( tidak ada autokorelasi) 
H0 ditolak 
autokorelasi 
(+) 
H0 ditolak 
autokorelasi 
(-) 
Ragu-
ragu 
Ragu-
ragu 
dU =  
1,730 
dL = 
1,193 
4- dU = 
2,270 
4- dL = 
2,807 
1,691 
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Appendix 13 Autocorrelation Results – Run Test 
Runs Test 
 Unstandardized 
Residual 
Test Value
a
 ,22743 
Cases < Test Value 16 
Cases >= Test Value 17 
Total Cases 33 
Number of Runs 18 
Z ,005 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) ,996 
a. Median 
Source: Data processed using SPSS ver 20 
